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Abstract 
We analyse the impact of sovereign rating actions by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch on bank 
valuations in emerging markets. We find strong evidence of a rating channel for the 
transmission of sovereign risk to bank valuations. Collateral and guarantee channels play 
modest roles, but are more relevant to countries that experienced positive actions. Positive 
sovereign actions by S&P have the strongest impact on bank valuations. Both negative and 
positive new rating information, outlook and watch actions are associated with strong market 
impact. The findings identify clear evidence of links between emerging market governments’ 
external credit standing and banks’ market valuation. 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of sovereign risks on economic and financial performance has recently 
attracted huge attention given such serious events as the European sovereign debt crisis and 
the turmoil in the Middle East (e.g. Liu et al., 2013). Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are active 
in financial markets through disclosing credit information, which reduces information 
asymmetries and enables borrowers to access capital markets. Sovereign ratings are opinions 
of the CRAs on the ability and willingness of governments to meet their financial 
commitments. Sovereign ratings are particularly important in emerging economies because 
they are generally more risky, and the information flows are of lower quality compared to 
developed countries. Investors pay close attention to sovereign rating actions when investing 
capital in emerging countries.   
CRAs’ activities in emerging markets have expanded rapidly in recent years. For 
example, S&P’s coverage of sovereign ratings increased from seven in 1975 to 129 in 
December 2014, with the growth coming predominantly from emerging countries seeking 
access to global financial markets. Many factors motivate governments in emerging countries 
to seek ratings from CRAs. Sovereign ratings enhance the capability of emerging countries’ 
governments and private sectors to access global capital markets and help to attract foreign 
direct investment. The net private capital flows to emerging markets reached a record volume 
of $1,231 billion in 2013 (IIF, 2014). Kim and Wu (2008) find that improvements in an 
emerging market’s sovereign rating improve international capital inflows in the form of 
foreign direct investment, international banking flows and portfolio flows. Kim and Wu 
(2011) highlight that improvements to the sovereign ratings in one region draw G7 bank 
inflows away from the other emerging market world regions. Using a sample of 19 emerging 
countries, Christopher et al. (2012) find that sovereign credit signals positively affect regional 
stock market integration. Rating upgrades provide benefits for surrounding countries in a 
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region, while rating downgrades lead to investors shifting funds from the downgraded 
country into the surrounding region.  
Credit risk changes are more frequent in emerging markets and events can unfold 
quickly and unpredictably (e.g. Russia in 2014). Thus, the role of CRAs is more challenging, 
problematic and costly in emerging markets. An understanding of the effects of sovereign 
ratings in emerging markets has become important given the significant and growing flow of 
institutional funds into emerging countries due to globalisation and investors’ increasing 
focus on international diversification. Many emerging market governments have issued 
dollar-denominated sovereign bonds in order to give their private sectors better access to 
external funds. Duggar et al. (2009) identify that 71% of defaults by rated corporates in 
emerging markets occur during sovereign crises. They also suggest that sovereign credit risk 
is a key factor in corporate defaults outside sovereign credit events.  
One of the main constraints for emerging market non-sovereign issuers is that their 
rating rarely surpasses the sovereign rating. Borensztein et al. (2013) refer to this as the 
sovereign ceiling ‘lite’, and they find that sovereign ratings can affect the cost of borrowing 
in the private sector. They also highlight that sovereign defaults can have a serious negative 
impact on the domestic economy as a whole, or have ‘spillover’ effects from the sovereign to 
private debtors. Other impacts include the imposition of direct capital controls or measures 
that prevent private borrowers from servicing their external obligations when the sovereign 
reaches a situation near default. 
In general, links between sovereigns and the financial sector have become a highly 
topical issue. Several studies analyse potential links or contagion channels between sovereign 
credit risk and banks, but primarily for developed countries (see Section 2.2). Because 
emerging market bank ratings are strongly related to their sovereign ratings (e.g. Williams et 
al., 2013), actions on the sovereign rating affect banks’ cost of capital, their capital 
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requirements, government guarantees and to some extent their profitability from 
lending/borrowing decisions.  
This paper investigates whether changes in sovereign creditworthiness affect the stock 
market valuations of banks in emerging markets. The analysis extends to consider several 
channels through which such effects could permeate. Effects based on the rating channel 
(through the sovereign ceiling), countries’ levels of financial freedom, domestic credit levels, 
collateral and government guarantees are considered.  
This paper focuses on the relative influence of actions by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. 
The sample period is 2001-2011, and the data includes daily time series of sovereign rating 
changes along with changes to outlook and watch status. While rating changes communicate 
permanent changes in issuer credit quality, credit outlook and watch are supplemental 
instruments to signal potential rating adjustments. Prior studies show that outlook and watch 
actions are at least as important as rating changes in their market impact (e.g. Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym, 2012; Sy, 2004). We examine how the share prices of 277 banks react to sovereign 
rating events for 19 emerging market countries. The data allows us to identify which CRAs 
induce reactions in emerging market bank valuations, and which rating action type (if any) 
induces the strongest reactions. Prior literature shows that all three CRAs play different, but 
nevertheless significant roles in the markets (e.g. Afonso et al., 2012; Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym, 2012; Hill and Faff, 2010), yet many studies examine data from only one CRA (e.g. 
Caporale et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013). We also examine the joint impact of the three CRAs 
by constructing a ‘new rating information’ variable, which can potentially demonstrate that 
market participants make use of the rating information provided by all three CRAs.  
The key findings are as follows. There is strong evidence of a rating channel for the 
transmission of sovereign risk to bank valuations, while collateral and guarantee channels 
only play modest roles, but are more relevant to countries that experienced positive sovereign 
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rating actions. We highlight unequal responses to the three CRAs’ actions, driven by 
variations in rating policy and rating models across the three largest CRAs. Positive signals 
by S&P induce the strongest positive bank returns, while negative independent actions by 
Fitch are the timeliest signals. We find that both positive and negative new rating 
information, outlook and watch actions have a strong impact on bank valuations. We also 
show a stronger effect of S&P positive (negative) sovereign actions on bank valuations in 
countries with tighter (less) government controls over their banking systems. Further, Fitch 
actions have a stronger impact on bank valuations in countries where the financial sectors 
provide higher levels of domestic credit. Banks in countries with higher sovereign ratings are 
more affected by Moody’s positive sovereign actions. Positive sovereign rating actions have 
a stronger (weaker) impact on bank valuations in countries running relatively lower (higher) 
levels of government debt. In contrast to other evidence for developed countries, we find that 
larger banks in emerging countries are neither perceived as being safer nor more vulnerable 
in times of sovereign distress. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous 
literature, while Section 3 provides a framework for the empirical design. Section 4 explains 
the data sample and presents the methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, and 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
  
2. Literature review 
2.1. Market impact of sovereign rating actions 
Prior literature demonstrates that sovereign rating news affects financial markets. 
Negative credit signals impact own-country equity and bond markets and cause significant 
spillovers to other countries’ equity and bond markets, while upgrades have limited or 
insignificant impact (e.g. Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; Sy, 2004; Gande and Parsley, 
2005; Ferreira and Gama, 2007; Hill and Faff, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012). Negative credit 
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signals are typically more informative than positive ones, given the stronger negative 
reputational effects for a CRA being tardy in the case of downgrades.  
Contrary to the findings of other studies, Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) find that 
positive sovereign rating actions by S&P in emerging markets significantly narrow CDS 
spreads, whilst no significant effect is found around negative sovereign rating actions. 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) find that emerging market sovereign upgrades by S&P are 
associated with significant own-country currency appreciations. They also highlight 
important inter-CRA differences, where Moody’s has an informational lead in upgrades in 
developed markets, and Fitch downgrades are associated with significant currency 
depreciations in both developed and emerging markets. Chen et al. (2013) find that countries 
experience significant declines in their private investment growth following sovereign rating 
downgrades by S&P. These declines following downgrades are found to last one to two 
years. They find that upgrades have a permanent impact on private investment growth. 
 
2.2. Contagion channels between sovereigns and banks 
Several studies analyse potential links or contagion channels between banks and 
sovereigns, but primarily for developed markets. BIS (2011) identifies four main channels 
through which changes in sovereign creditworthiness can affect bank funding costs and 
conditions, including: links between sovereign and bank ratings (ratings channel); using 
sovereign securities as collateral to secure funding from the central bank and market sources 
(collateral channel); government guarantees (guarantee channel); and banks’ holdings of 
sovereign debt (assets holding channel).  
BIS (2011) only offers brief and descriptive evidence on the rating channel. Shen et 
al. (2012) find that the sovereign rating commonly acts as the ceiling for domestic bank 
ratings. Alsakka et al. (2014) analyse the linkages between European sovereign and bank 
ratings, and find that sovereign rating downgrades and negative watch signals significantly 
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impact bank rating downgrades during the global financial crisis. Williams et al. (2013) show 
that bank ratings in emerging market are particularly sensitive to sovereign rating actions, and 
have very high probabilities of being upgraded (downgraded) following an upgrade 
(downgrade) to their home sovereign. Banks’ capital requirements can be tied to their credit 
ratings, therefore sovereign upgrades (downgrades) can lead to bank upgrades (downgrades), 
which subsequently can reduce (increase) a bank’s cost of capital.   
On the collateral channel, Correa et al. (2012) find that U.S. branches of European 
banks suffered a significant decline in their access to dollar funding from U.S. money market 
funds in 2011. They also find that the size of the decline is proportional to the increase in the 
sovereign risk of their home country. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) investigate the contagion 
effect between bank and sovereign defaults during the European sovereign debt crisis, and 
find that banks with potentially more volatile funding (i.e. with a higher proportion of short-
term debt in their total funding) are more exposed to shocks in the quality of their assets and 
exhibit higher sovereign-bank contagion, which is an indication of the collateral channel. 
They also find that banks with higher ratios of short-term funding along with higher 
sovereign debt exposures are more vulnerable to increased sovereign-bank contagion.  
Another link between governments and banks is through the ‘too-big-to-fail’ status of 
some large banks, or the guarantee channel. If sovereigns find themselves in a financial 
distress situation, then not only their ability to explicitly or implicitly support large banks will 
decrease, but also market participants will be aware of this and therefore bank valuations may 
be affected. Alter and Schuler (2012) show that after European government intervention for 
distressed banks, increased sovereign default risk was found to impact on banks’ CDS 
spreads. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) find that larger banks have lower sovereign-bank 
contagion since they are perceived as being too-big-to-fail. However, the default risk of 
larger banks is more strongly correlated with their home sovereign’s default risk because 
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their perceived riskiness is partly tied to the probability of government support. They also 
find that sovereign-bank default contagion is greater for countries running higher debt-to-
GDP ratios. Correa et al. (2014) find that banks which are expected to receive government 
support demonstrate lower stock returns after a sovereign rating downgrade, and (for their 
European sample of banks and sovereigns) the effect remains even after controlling for 
domestic government debt holdings on banks’ balance sheets. 
Angeloni and Wolff (2012) investigate whether banks are affected by holdings of 
government debt (assets holding channel), and find that banks’ valuations are affected by 
their exposure to European sovereign debts. In particular, they show that European banks 
were hit by developments in Greek, Italian and Irish sovereign debts. Related to this, De 
Bruyckere et al. (2013) show that contagion between sovereign and bank default risk in 
Europe is stronger where banks’ exposure to the sovereign is greater. Correa et al. (2014) 
report that European sovereign upgrades have a positive impact on domestic banks that hold 
relatively large volumes of government debt in their portfolios. 
The above channels emphasise a direction of causality from the sovereign to its banks. 
However, the interconnections between banking and sovereign risks could induce causality in 
both directions. Higher banking risk transforms into higher sovereign risk because of the 
increased probability that a given government has to rescue the domestic banking system. 
The effect of banking sectors on sovereign risks depends on the quality of the financial 
system in terms of aggregate bank credit risk and the size and development of the banking 
sector within the sovereign’s economy (e.g. Acharya et al., 2014, BIS, 2011). Consequently, 
the typical time horizon for any causal effect from banks’ share values to the sovereign rating 
is far longer than for the reverse direction of causality.1 A deterioration of sovereign 
                                                          
1 For example, while Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, the USA maintained its top-notch sovereign credit 
rating until 2011. Similarly, Moody’s and Fitch downgraded the UK’s sovereign rating in 2013, five years after 
the failures of the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group. 
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creditworthiness immediately increases banks’ credit risks due to the channels discussed 
above. BIS (2011) also highlights a key channel in the bank-to-sovereign direction, whereby 
there can be a drain on public resources through bank bailouts arising from the desire to 
maintain financial stability.2 In our emerging market sample, this scenario has very limited 
relevance. Further, emerging countries have generally experienced strong positive trends in 
their sovereign ratings over the past two decades, arising from higher oil and natural gas 
prices, inexpensive skilled labour and subsequent economic growth, and not typically related 
to developments in their banking sectors. 
 
3. Empirical design for contagion channels  
Several insights from Section 2.2 motivate the empirical design. First, the rating 
channel implies a direct link between a sovereign rating action and a bank’s rating. This is 
expected to feed through to the bank’s cost of funding and thereby its market valuation. This 
channel is examined using different types of sovereign credit actions (see Eq. (2) in Section 
4.4, and Section 5.1). We expect banks’ market valuations to increase (decline) following 
positive (negative) sovereign credit actions. Since we use credit actions across three CRAs, 
we anticipate that ‘new rating information’ on the sovereign will have most effect.  
We also investigate how the level of government control over the banking system 
influences the rating channel and hence the sensitivity of banks’ market valuations to recent 
sovereign rating actions (see Eq. (3) in Section 4.4). Beck et al. (2006) show that fewer 
official impediments to bank operations could stimulate efficiency and diversification that 
promotes stability, and thus a country with greater financial freedom is less likely to 
experience a banking crisis. We use the Heritage Foundation’s Financial Freedom index to 
                                                          
2 This scenario arguably had most effect in the context of European countries, particularly Ireland, Spain and the 
UK, during the global financial crisis. Yet, Alsakka et al. (2014) find no evidence whatsoever of a bank-to-
sovereign channel (only a sovereign-to-bank ratings channel) in European countries. 
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measure a country’s banking efficiency and its independence from government control and to 
indicate the level of government regulation of financial services, the degree of government 
intervention in the financial sector, and the level of financial and capital market development. 
Higher values indicate fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. Williams et al. (2013) show 
that the lower the country’s financial freedom score (stronger government control), the more 
likely are bank ratings of emerging countries to follow recent sovereign rating upgrades. 
Hence, for countries which experience positive sovereign rating actions, we expect the 
positive effect on bank valuation to be stronger in countries with tighter controls over their 
banking systems. Williams et al. (2013) also show that banks in countries with less 
government control are more likely to be downgraded following sovereign rating 
downgrades. Hence, for countries which experience negative rating actions, we expect the 
negative effect on bank valuation to be stronger in countries with less government control 
over their banking systems. Further, we control for a country’s banking sector depth and 
financial sector development using domestic credit/GDP (obtained from the World Bank). 
We expect sovereign rating actions to have a larger impact on bank valuations in countries 
with higher values of domestic credit/GDP, since a sovereign rating change is likely to have a 
strong economic impact in such cases. 
Second, we use rating levels to investigate the presence of a collateral channel. Fig.1 
illustrates that low and intermediate sovereign ratings dominate our data sample (with very 
few rating observations above the ‘A’ category). It is well established since Diamond (1991) 
that lower-rated debt issuers will be more heavily dependent on short-term funding and may 
have no access to medium- or long-term funding. Alongside the sovereign ceiling effect, 
whereby bank ratings, particularly in emerging markets, rarely surpass the sovereign rating 
(e.g. Shen et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2013), we infer that any effect via the collateral 
channel will be most apparent in countries with lower sovereign ratings. Therefore, the 
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collateral channel may induce a stronger effect of negative (positive) rating actions on banks 
in emerging markets with relatively low (high) sovereign ratings, because they will be more 
(less) dependent on short-term funding. Hence, this channel is studied via the comprehensive 
credit rating level of a given country (see Eq. (2) in Section 4.4).3  
Third, following De Bruyckere et al. (2013) and Correa et al. (2014), the guarantee 
channel is studied via the debt-to-GDP ratio and the size of banks’ total assets (see Eq. (4) in 
Section 4.4). We test whether larger banks are perceived as being safer since they can benefit 
from government support. Alternatively, in times of sovereign distress, larger banks may 
become more vulnerable since the probability of the home government being able to support 
the large banks decreases. The debt-to-GDP ratio enables the investigation of how market 
participants perceive a government’s ability to support its banking sector. A government with 
relatively high indebtedness may be perceived as being less able to support its banking sector 
during times of stress, which could be reflected in bank stock prices’ reactions to sovereign 
credit actions.  
Finally, detailed bank-level data on domestic government debt holdings are sparse, 
and therefore we are unable to examine the assets holding channel. As part of the 2011 bank 
stress tests, the European Banking Authority published bank-level data on government debt 
holdings as of year-end 2010 for banks in 21 European countries (used by prior studies, e.g. 
Angeloni and Wolff, 2012; De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Correa et al.; 2014). Unfortunately, 
there is no similar test for banks in emerging countries that would offer suitable data.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Rating channel variables and the comprehensive credit rating level of a given country (see Table 1) are also 
retained in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4). 
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4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Sample selection  
The initial sampling is based on countries’ GNI per capita in the 2011 World Bank 
country classification. All low-income and middle-income countries are defined as being 
‘emerging’. The emerging market bank shares must be listed and traded in order to be 
selected. Using DataStream, the share prices are gathered for all the listed banks from 
countries that meet the emerging market criteria and have share prices available from January 
2000 onwards. The final sample consists of 19 emerging market countries.4 
Data is available for a total of 277 qualifying banks from these countries. 160 of the 
banks are rated by at least one of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch.5 The bank data is unbalanced by 
country, since the numbers of listed banks vary across countries, e.g. there are eight 
Argentinean banks and fourteen Chinese banks which meet the selection criteria. The bank 
data is also unbalanced by time in some cases, because there can be more banks in the sample 
for a country in a certain year than for the same country in another year, which arises due to 
new stock market listings or bank mergers and acquisitions.  
The sample only includes financial institutions because there is a far stronger link 
between sovereigns and banks than corporations (see Borensztein et al., 2013; Huang and 
Shen, 2014). For example, corporates do not use sovereign bonds as collateral and for this 
reason are not equally affected by sovereign rating fluctuations. In addition, the guarantee 
channel is only applicable for banks and not corporates, since banks receive government 
support (e.g. deposit insurance schemes, lender of last resort), and (too-big-to-fail) banks tend 
                                                          
4 Sample construction is driven by banks’ listed status and available bank share price data, not by selection of 
countries. The countries in the sample are as follows: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, 
Thailand, and Turkey. 
5 Empirical testing controlled for rated versus non-rated banks, but no significant effect was identified (results 
are available upon request). 
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to be rescued by governments during financial distress periods. Further, banks are typically 
more likely than corporations to be rated at the sovereign ceiling (e.g. Huang and Shen, 
2014). Borensztein et al. (2013) find that the links between corporate and sovereign risks are 
more significant in countries where capital account restrictions are in place and in countries 
with high political risk.  
 
4.2. Credit rating data 
         The credit dataset includes daily long-term foreign-currency sovereign ratings, outlooks 
and watch status by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch from 1st January 2001 to 30th September 2011. 
All actions are verified by using S&P, Moody’s and Fitch publications. Positive credit actions 
include rating upgrades, positive outlook signals, positive watch events, and a combination of 
these i.e. a sovereign can be upgraded and simultaneously placed on positive outlook or 
positive watch. Negative credit actions include rating downgrades, negative outlook signals, 
negative watch events, and a combination of these i.e. a sovereign can be downgraded and 
simultaneously placed on negative outlook or watch.6 
Rating upgrades (downgrades) are defined as an upward (downward) move in the 20-
notch numerical scale (AAA/Aaa = 20, AA+/Aa1 = 19, AA/Aa2 = 18… Caa3/CCC- = 2, 
Ca/CC/C/SD-D = 1).7 Table 1 illustrates the 20-notch scale in full. Negative watch actions 
include placing sovereign j on watch for possible downgrade, and the action of confirming 
the rating of sovereign j after being on watch for possible upgrade. Positive watch actions 
include placing sovereign j on watch for possible upgrade, and the action of confirming the 
rating of sovereign j after being on watch for possible downgrade. Negative outlook actions 
include changes to negative outlook from stable/positive outlook, and changes to stable 
                                                          
6 Upgrades (downgrades) are never combined with opposing outlook or watch actions, e.g. an upgrade is not 
combined with a negative outlook or watch action.   
7 Multiple-notch sovereign rating upgrades (downgrades) are rare in this sample, therefore we focus on rating 
upgrades (downgrades) as one group. 
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outlook from positive outlook. Positive outlook actions include changes to positive outlook 
from stable/negative outlook, and changes to stable outlook from negative outlook.  
Table 2 presents summary data on the S&P and Moody’s (Fitch) sovereign credit 
actions for 19 (18) emerging market countries. There are a total of: 154, 122 and 128 
sovereign rating actions for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively.8 There are 47 (21), 43 (9) 
and 38 (19) upgrades (downgrades) by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively. Most of the 
upgrades and downgrades are by one-notch, however, there are four, six and five cases of 
multiple-notch rating changes for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively. Some of these 
upgrade and downgrade actions are combined with either a positive (negative) outlook 
adjustment, or a negative watch adjustment. There are 21, 10 and 13 rating changes by S&P, 
Moody’s and Fitch, respectively, announced simultaneously with an outlook/watch action 
(see Rows 11 - 14 in Table 2).  
The dataset also comprises: 49 (31), 32 (11) and 40 (23) positive (negative) outlook 
adjustments that are announced in isolation, i.e. with no simultaneous upgrade (downgrade), 
by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively; and 2 (4), 25 (2) and 4 (4) positive (negative) 
isolated watch announcements by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively.9 The proportion of 
positive (negative) rating actions as a percentage of the total rating actions by S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch is 64% (36%), 82% (18%) and 64% (36%), respectively, (see Rows 15 - 17 in 
Table 2). This reflects the strong upgrade trend in emerging markets during this time period.  
                                                          
8 In total, there are 182, 147 and 149 sovereign rating actions by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch for these countries in 
this time period. However, there is insufficient bank share price data for Bulgaria, Romania and Russia pre-May 
2006, June 2004 and December 2004, respectively. Another reason for the loss of credit data is the new 
presidency and capital crisis in Pakistan in 2008, where trading of shares was affected from mid-September 
2008 to mid-December 2008, therefore the observations are restricted to before this time period. Also, the 2011 
Egyptian revolution affected trading of bank shares from 28th January 2011 to 23rd March 2011. Therefore, 
rating actions to Egypt during and after this time are omitted. 
9 The two positive watch actions by S&P in the sample are occasions where a sovereign rating was taken off 
negative watch to stable outlook with no rating change. Under the definition in this section, this is regarded as a 
positive watch action.  
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S&P is the most active amongst the three CRAs with 154 total sovereign rating 
actions (98 positive and 56 negative actions) compared to 122 (100 positive and 22 negative) 
and 128 (82 positive and 46 negative) from Moody’s and Fitch, respectively. S&P is also the 
CRA with rating actions most likely to present new sovereign rating information to the 
market. We define a sovereign rating action that presents ‘new rating information’ to be a 
rating action to sovereign j which is either in the opposite direction to the previous rating 
action (i.e. a positive action following a negative action) it received by any of the three 
CRAs, or a rating action that takes sovereign j to a new rating level, either below the 
prevailing lowest rating by the other two CRAs or above the prevailing highest rating by the 
other two CRAs according to the 58-point numerical scale.10 Under this definition, 54% of 
S&P’s sovereign rating actions present new rating information compared to 46% by Moody’s 
and 39% by Fitch (see Rows 22 - 24 in Table 2).  
An important point to consider is the clustering of sovereign rating actions, which is 
of particular importance in crisis periods e.g. Argentina faced five negative rating actions 
from the three largest CRAs between 19th March 2001 and 28th March 2001. There are six 
cases in the credit sample where a sovereign rating receives actions by two CRAs on the 
same day, namely Argentina by Moody’s and Fitch on 28th March 2001 and 12th October 
2001, Brazil by Moody’s and Fitch on 26th June 2002, the Philippines by S&P and Fitch on 
11th July 2005, and Thailand by S&P and Fitch on 19th September 2006 and 1st December 
2008. For each case, the sovereign ratings received negative actions by both CRAs involved. 
To account for the clustering of sovereign rating actions, we define an event for sovereign j 
as being ‘clustered’ when it has received another rating action within 21 trading days (of day 
                                                          
10 For the latter ‘new rating information’ criteria, we use a 58-point comprehensive credit ratings (CCR) scale, 
which includes actual ratings as well as outlooks and watch, as follows: AAA/Aaa = 58, AA+/Aa1 = 55, 
AA/Aa2 = 52… CCC-/Caa3 = 4, CC/Ca, SD-D/C = 1, and we add ‘+2’ for negative watch, ‘+1’ for positive 
outlook, ‘-1’ for negative outlook, ‘-2’ for negative watch, and ‘0’ for stable outlook and no watch/outlook 
assignment. Table 1 presents the full 20-notch and 58-point CCR scales. 
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t = 0) by any of the three CRAs. We also define an ‘independent’ event, when sovereign j 
experiences a rating action without having received another rating action in the same (-10, 
+11) window. The sample is split into independent and clustered actions for both positive and 
negative events. From Table 2, negative events are more likely to be clustered, i.e. 39% 
(22/56), 55% (12/22), and 37% (17/46) of the total negative events from S&P, Moody’s and 
Fitch, respectively, are clustered, whereas 21% (21/98), 24% (24/100), and 26% (22/82) of 
the total positive events are clustered. 
 
4.3. Abnormal returns 
 We employ event day methodology to examine the reaction of bank share prices to 
their home country’s sovereign rating actions. The share prices are quoted in their local 
currencies and are transformed into log returns. We carefully consider an appropriate method 
to calculate the abnormal returns. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) argue that the results over 
short time windows immediately around the event date are not sensitive to different measures 
of abnormal returns. Hill and Faff (2010) prefer the mean-adjusted returns to calculate the 
abnormal returns, and they also use a market model and index model for robustness, and their 
findings do not change. Therefore, we select the mean-adjusted returns method to calculate 
the abnormal returns. The mean daily return for each bank prior to a sovereign rating event is 
calculated using 200 daily observations for the period t = -230 to t = -30, where t = 0 is the 
event day (i.e. a sovereign rating action).11 This represents the expected daily return (ER). 
Daily abnormal returns (AR) are calculated for each day in the event window as follows:  
                   ARit = Rit - ERit                                                                                                   (1) 
Where: i = 1, 277 (banks); 
ARit = abnormal log return of bank i at time t. 
                                                          
11  In the event of market closures e.g. national holidays, the time period is extended as necessary.  
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Rit = log return of bank i at time t. 
ERit = expected log return of bank i at time t. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are evaluated over the pre-event (-10, -1), event 
(0, +1) and the post-event (+2, +11) windows. Gande and Parsley (2005) suggest the short 
two-day (0, +1) event window to reduce contamination from other credit events. The pre-
event (-10, -1) window will capture market sentiment immediately before the event, and the 
post-event (+2, +11) window will capture any delayed market impact from the sovereign 
credit events. Standard errors are calculated following Boehmer et al.’s (1991) standardized 
cross-sectional test, to account for event induced variance.12 
 
4.4. Panel data estimations 
We conduct panel data estimations with country and time fixed effects to investigate 
the factors that affect the CARs of banks around the time of sovereign rating actions.13 
Following recent literature, separate panel estimations are run for positive and negative 
sovereign rating actions (Gande and Parsley, 2005; Ferreira and Gama, 2007; Afonso et al., 
2012). All panel estimations are run for an aggregate index of sovereign rating actions by all 
three CRAs to examine market participants’ perceptions of the sovereign credit rating 
information available to them from the three CRAs. We also perform panel estimations for 
each CRA individually to highlight which CRA’s actions may be driving the results.  
                                                          
12 The MSCI All Countries World Index is utilised to calculate the standardized residual. We test whether the 
results are being affected by thin trading using a sub-sample filtered according to the amount of non-zero returns 
in the 200-day estimation period (t = -230 to t = -30). If there are fewer than 100 daily returns available in an 
estimation period then the observation is excluded (see Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986). In the interests of 
brevity, we do not report these results, but we can confirm that accounting for thin trading makes no difference 
to the conclusions drawn. These results are available upon request. 
13 We perform Hausman tests in all panel estimations to determine whether fixed or random effects 
specifications are most appropriate. The Hausman test results support the use of fixed effects. 
17 
 
 The first set of panel data estimations tests the sovereign rating channel and collateral 
channel variables (see Section 3), as follows: 
itjtjtjt10
jt9jt8jt7jt6jt5jt4
jt3jt2jt1ijt
εςYγCoNlaggedβ
PlaggedβNspilloverβPspilloverβCCRβCombinedβOut/watchβ
ve speculatito Investmentβinvestment to eSpeculativβninformatio rating NewβαCAR



  (2) 
CARijt is the mean-adjusted cumulative abnormal return of bank i domiciled in sovereign j in 
the two-day event window (0, +1) around a sovereign rating action at time t. The following 
variables are used to examine the sovereign rating channel. New rating information is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the sovereign rating action satisfies the new 
rating information criteria defined in Section 4.2, and zero otherwise. Speculative to 
investment (Investment to speculative) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
rating action takes event sovereign j from speculative (investment) grade to investment 
(speculative) grade, and zero otherwise. This variable captures whether this threshold is 
important in this context. Out/watch is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
sovereign rating action is a change to the outlook or watch status only (with no actual rating 
change), and zero otherwise. Combined is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
sovereign j has experienced multiple events on date t by either the same CRA (i.e. sovereign j 
is upgraded (downgraded) and simultaneously placed on positive (negative) outlook or watch 
by the same CRA) or by more than one CRA on date t (i.e. for the aggregate case), and zero 
otherwise. Sovereign rating upgrades (downgrades) that occur in isolation (i.e. with no 
simultaneous placement on outlook or watch) are taken as the reference category in order to 
examine whether certain types of rating actions induce a stronger (or weaker) reaction in the 
bank share prices. 
CCR is the comprehensive credit rating level of country j (see Table 1). We use CCR 
to examine the collateral channel (see Section 3). We control for potential cross country 
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spillover effects from non-event country rating actions to the bank share prices with 
Pspillover (Nspillover).14 Pspillover (Nspillover) is a positive (negative) net total rating 
change according to the logit-type transformation of the 58-point rating scale (LCCR)15 by all 
three CRAs to sovereigns in the same world region as sovereign j in the 10 trading days prior 
to event date t. This variable does not include any rating change that may have occurred to 
sovereign j during the same time period. Pspillover (Nspillover) controls for the sovereign 
rating trend of countries in the same world region as sovereign j according to the World 
Bank’s region definitions.16 Following Ferreira and Gama (2007) and Ismailescu and Kazemi 
(2011), we control for the intensity of sovereign j’s past events with Plagged (Nlagged). 
Plagged (Nlagged) is the positive (negative) net total rating change according to the logit-
type transformation of the 58-point rating scale (see footnote 15 and Table 1) to sovereign j 
by all three CRAs in the 10 trading days prior to event date t. The absolute values of 
Nspillover and Nlagged are used for ease of interpretation. Co and Y are full sets of country 
and year dummies to control for the country and time fixed effects. This rules out purely 
cross-country explanations and any overall time trend. 
The methodology employed is similar to Gande and Parsley (2005) in considering 
event days only. This is a crucial point to recall when interpreting the results in the following 
section. In order to obtain robust estimators to any potential heteroscedasticity and/or 
autocorrelation in the residuals, a White correction is performed on the standard deviation of 
the estimated coefficients (Gande and Parsley, 2005; Ferreira and Gama, 2007).  
                                                          
14 See Section 2.1, where we discuss literature on cross-country spillover effects of sovereign rating actions.  
15 The logit-type transformation of the 58-point rating scale (LCCR) addresses possible non-linearity in the 
rating scale, whereby LCCR = ln [CCR/ (59-CCR)]. See Sy (2004) and Table 1.  
16 We have merged the following into two regions: (i) Africa merged with Middle East and North Africa; (ii) 
South Asia merged with East Asia and Pacific. 
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The next set of panel estimations examines whether the impact of sovereign rating 
actions on bank valuations is influenced by the government control over the banking system 
and the level of domestic credit (see Section 3). The model is as follows: 
itjtjtjt12jt11jt10
jt9jt8jt7jt6jt5jt4
jt3jt2jt1ijt
εςYγCocredit/GDP Domesticβfreedom FinancialβNlaggedβ
PlaggedβNspilloverβPspilloverβCCRβCombinedβOut/watchβ
ve speculatito Investmentβinvestment to eSpeculativβninformatio rating NewβαCAR



   (3) 
The financial freedom index (obtained from the Heritage Foundation) ranks a country 
from 0 to 100, in intervals of 10 (see Beck et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2013). The financial 
freedom of our sample countries varies from 30 to 70 inclusive. Scores of 30 and 40 represent 
countries with extensive and strong government interference, respectively. Scores of 50 and 
60 represent countries with considerable and significant government interference, 
respectively. The group of countries with the highest value of 70 in the sample represents 
countries with limited government interference. Domestic credit/GDP (obtained from the 
World Bank) is the domestic credit provided by the financial sector as a share of GDP, which 
controls for a country’s banking sector depth and development. 
 The final set of panel estimations utilises a set of variables that aims to examine the 
guarantee channel (see Section 3). The model is as follows: 
itjtjtijt12jt11jt10
jt9jt8jt7jt6jt5jt4
jt3jt2jt1ijt
εςYγCoTA/GDPβDebt/GDPβNlaggedβ
PlaggedβNspilloverβPspilloverβCCRβCombinedβOut/watchβ
ve speculatito Investmentβinvestment to eSpeculativβninformatio rating NewβαCAR



  (4) 
 Debt/GDP is the total government debt as a percentage of GDP of the emerging 
sovereign j from the previous year to the sovereign rating action. TA/GDP is the total assets 
of bank i relative to the size of the domestic economy of sovereign j.  
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5. Empirical results and discussion 
5.1. Preliminary analysis 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the average bank mean-adjusted CARs around positive 
sovereign credit events, while Panel B of Table 3 presents the average bank mean-adjusted 
CARs around negative events. 
 
5.1.1. Positive credit events 
Positive rating actions by S&P are associated with positive and significant CARs of 
1.78% in the pre-event window and 0.91% in event window. All sub-samples for S&P 
present consistent event-window results and the strongest event window CARs appear in the 
combined actions and new rating information sub-samples, at 1.77% and 1.72% respectively. 
The post-event average CAR for outlook and watch actions is positive and significant, 
implying a persisting effect.    
For Moody’s, the results for all types of positive actions are unexpected because 
negative and significant CARs are found in the pre-event and event windows. However, new 
rating information actions by Moody’s are associated with a positive CAR of 0.29% in the 
event window, but it’s insignificant. The significant post-event window CAR of 0.81% 
surrounding outlook and watch actions and 0.76% for clustered events, suggests that these 
types of events have a delayed positive relation with the bank share prices.  
           New rating information and combined actions by Fitch have positive CARs in the 
event window, however both are insignificant. The event window average CAR is negative 
and significant in the all actions, outlook and watch signals, independent, and clustered 
samples. We observe positive and significant CARs in the pre- and post-event windows for 
combined actions, which suggest that these types of actions occur when market sentiment is 
already positive due to other good news in the market.  
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The observation of negative responses to some types of positive rating news by 
Moody’s and Fitch deserves some further rationalisation. In what ways could positive news 
for the sovereign imply negative news for banks? There are several possibilities, including (i) 
greater corporate access to international fund flows (as in Kim and Wu, 2008, 2011) hence 
less role for local banks; (ii) expectation of declining margins on lending as future interest 
rates fall; (iii) greater government confidence in its economic policies, which could have 
implications for taxation and regulation of the financial sector; (iv) a very inefficient stock 
market. However, the effects are investigated further in the multivariate analysis. 
 
5.1.2. Negative credit events 
For S&P, a significant average CAR of -4.67% in the pre-event window and an 
insignificant event window CAR are reported for ‘all actions’. This suggests that S&P 
negative events are either following bad news already known in the market or that they are 
anticipated. The positive and significant post-event window CAR of 1.68% suggests that the 
market is anticipating S&P negative actions. Negative outlook and watch signals and 
clustered actions are informative, with event window CARs of -1.10% and -1.69%.  
Almost all types of negative credit actions by Moody’s have significant relations with 
bank valuations, given the negative and significant event window CARs. Moody’s combined 
actions, outlook and watch signals, new rating information actions and clustered actions have 
significant pre-event window CARs, suggesting that these actions happen either during times 
of negative market sentiment due to other adverse news that exists, or that the markets are 
anticipating an impending sovereign rating action, or both. Yet, the insignificant post-event 
CARs suggest that the bank share prices are correlated with the rating actions, because if they 
are reacting to some other adverse news, then one would expect negative and significant post-
event CARs. The bank share prices are linked to actual rating downgrades because 
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insignificant pre- and post-event window CARs surround the significant and negative event 
window CAR of -1.47%.  
Negative actions by Fitch are negatively and significantly related to the banks’ share 
prices, with an overall event window average CAR of -0.78%. The insignificant pre- and 
post-event window CARs suggest that there is a relationship between negative sovereign 
credit actions and bank share prices, and that it is not other news affecting the banks. This 
result seems to be driven by the negative outlook and watch signals because we observe a 
significant event window CAR of -1.33%. Independent actions show clear-cut results with a 
significant event window CAR of -0.47%, and insignificant pre- and post-event window 
CARs. There is also a significant relation with clustered actions, with pre-event and event 
window CARs of -5.52% and -1.35%.  
 
5.2. Sovereign rating and collateral channels  
      Table 4 presents the results from estimations based on Eq. (2). Panel A considers positive 
sovereign rating actions, whereby positive (negative) coefficients indicate stronger (weaker) 
impacts on bank valuations compared to upgrades as the reference case. We find that new 
rating information actions by S&P and Fitch (not Moody’s) significantly increase the two-
day CARs of banks by 0.69% and 1.13%, respectively. Increased abnormal returns of 3.69% 
(7.12%) are found within one day following positive rating actions that take the sovereign 
from speculative to investment grade by S&P (Fitch). Positive outlook and watch actions and 
combined actions by Fitch have a significantly weaker impact on bank valuations than do 
actual upgrades (with no outlook/watch adjustment). Combined actions by S&P have a 
stronger impact on bank valuation than actual upgrades (with no outlook/watch adjustment), 
whilst for Moody’s, combined actions have a weaker impact compared to actual upgrades. 
CCR is positive and significant for Moody’s, implying that positive sovereign credit actions 
23 
 
by Moody’s in higher rated countries have a stronger impact on bank valuations (which is 
related to the collateral channel).  
We find evidence that international spillover is an important factor to consider. The 
stronger the positive sovereign rating trend is in the same world region as sovereign j, the 
stronger will be the impact of the positive sovereign rating action on the bank share prices. In 
the aggregate estimation, a 1% increase in the Pspillover variable leads to a 5.85% increased 
impact on bank CARs. Nspillover is negative (positive) and significant for S&P and Moody’s 
(Fitch) which means that a 1% increase in this variable leads to a 13.71% and 8.69%  
(28.29%) decreased (increased) impact on bank valuations, respectively. Positive sovereign 
rating actions by Moody’s which follow soon after previous positive sovereign rating actions 
to the same sovereign have a weaker impact on bank valuations.  
Panel B in Table 4 presents the results of Eq. (2) for negative sovereign rating actions. 
Negative (positive) coefficients indicate stronger (weaker) impacts on bank valuations 
compared to downgrades as the reference case. We find that new rating information actions 
significantly decrease the two-day CAR of banks by 5.17% (8.04%) after negative actions by 
Moody’s (Fitch). We find no significant evidence that rating actions, which take the 
sovereign from investment to speculative grade, have an additional impact on bank 
valuations. Negative outlook and watch actions have a 2.29% stronger impact on bank 
valuations compared to actual downgrades (with no outlook/watch signal) in the aggregate 
model. The negative and significant coefficient is driven by negative outlook and watch 
actions by S&P and Moody’s. On the other hand, negative outlook and watch actions and 
combined actions by Fitch have a 9.73% and 9.74% weaker impact on bank share prices than 
downgrades (with no outlook/watch adjustment).17 CCR is insignificant in all negative 
actions’ estimations, implying no evidence of a collateral channel in linking adverse 
                                                          
17 This contrasts with Table 3, but greater reliance should be placed on the multivariate analysis here.  
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sovereign credit changes with bank valuation.  There is limited evidence that prior sovereign 
actions have an effect on bank valuations (Nspillover is only significant and positive for 
S&P). 
We examine whether there is a disproportionate effect of positive and negative 
sovereign rating actions on bank valuations depending on the financial freedom level of the 
country. Table 5 presents the results of Eq. (3). Financial Freedom is only significant and 
negative in the case of S&P (in both Panels). This is consistent with our expectations in both 
cases (see Section 3). This implies that for countries which experienced positive sovereign 
rating actions by S&P, the positive effect on bank valuation is stronger in countries with 
tighter controls over their banking systems. For countries which experienced negative 
sovereign rating actions by S&P, we find the negative effect on bank valuation is stronger in 
countries with less government control over their banking systems. Such effects are not 
evident for Moody’s and Fitch. We also find that both positive and negative sovereign rating 
actions by Fitch have a stronger impact on bank valuations in countries with relatively higher 
levels of domestic credit. This is consistent with our expectations (see Section 3), but the 
effects are absent from S&P and are in the opposite direction for Moody’s negative actions.  
 
5.3. Guarantee channel 
 We examine the guarantee channel using the debt/GDP and the TA/GDP ratios (see 
Section 3). Table 6 presents the results of Eq. (4). In Panel A, the coefficient for debt/GDP is 
significant and negative in the aggregate model for positive sovereign rating actions. This 
means that positive sovereign rating actions have a stronger (weaker) impact on bank 
valuations in countries running relatively lower (higher) levels of government debt. This 
result is mainly attributable to S&P and Moody’s positive actions. In the negative actions’ 
estimations in Panel B, the debt/GDP coefficient is insignificant in the aggregate model, 
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which suggests that the guarantee channel is only important when associated with positive 
sovereign rating actions and not negative sovereign rating actions.18 
We also investigate the guarantee channel through the actual size of the banks’ assets 
relative to the size of the domestic economy (TA/GDP), and find that TA/GDP is insignificant 
in all estimations. We also perform estimations with interactive variables including debt/GDP 
* TA/GDP and find that the coefficients are insignificant in all estimations.19 These variables 
test whether banks of different sizes relative to the overall debt burden of a country reveal 
any significantly different impact on bank valuations. It is important to highlight that in the 
positive and negative aggregate estimations the rating channel variables remain mostly 
unchanged. The sovereign rating channel variables are significant factors regardless of the 
inclusion of the debt/GDP and TA/GDP variables.  
 
5.4. Discussion  
There is clear evidence of unequal responses to the three CRAs’ actions. This is 
driven by variations in rating policy and rating models across the three largest CRAs (see 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012; Hill and Faff, 2010; Hill et al., 2010). Therefore, the results 
for the aggregate index of rating events of different CRAs should be treated with caution. In 
the aggregate estimations, some variables appear to be significant (e.g. positive new rating 
information) or insignificant (e.g. negative new rating information), while playing an 
important role in the individual estimations for one or two CRAs.   
The results highlight strong evidence of the rating channel for the transmission of 
changes in sovereign risk to bank valuations in emerging countries. Contrary to some prior 
studies on ratings, we find that both positive and negative sovereign rating actions have a 
                                                          
18 In Panel B, the debt/GDP coefficient is negative (positive) and significant for Moody’s (Fitch). This shows 
that negative sovereign rating actions from Moody’s (Fitch) have a stronger impact on bank valuations in 
countries that have relatively higher (lower) levels of overall government debt. 
19 In the interests of brevity, these are not tabulated. 
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significant market impact. New rating information actions tend to have a strong impact on 
bank valuations. Positive new rating information actions by S&P and Fitch increase bank 
share prices, while negative new rating information actions by Moody’s and Fitch 
significantly decrease bank valuations.20 Negative outlook and watch signals are at least as 
important as rating downgrades in their impact on bank valuations, which suggests that these 
actions reveal information previously unknown to market participants due to CRAs’ access to 
private information.21 In addition, the level of government control over the banking system 
influences the sensitivity of bank market valuations to recent S&P sovereign rating actions. 
We find stronger effects of S&P positive sovereign actions on bank valuations in countries 
with tighter controls over their banking systems. For countries which experienced negative 
sovereign rating actions (by S&P), the negative effect on bank valuations is stronger in 
countries with less government control over their banking systems. Further, we find that 
sovereign rating actions by Fitch have a stronger impact on bank valuations in countries with 
relatively higher levels of domestic credit. 
The collateral channel and guarantee channel only play modest roles on the basis of 
our evidence, but are more relevant to countries that experienced positive sovereign rating 
actions. Positive sovereign credit actions (by Moody’s) in higher rated countries have a 
stronger impact on bank valuations. This implies that banks with higher ratings will be more 
affected by positive rating actions, because they will potentially become less dependent on 
                                                          
20 However, for Moody’s, the coefficient for new rating information is affected by the introduction of additional 
variables in the model. Please note that the Moody’s negative action models have the fewest observations. 
21 The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) implies that stock prices will not adjust in response to the rating 
actions if the CRAs base their actions on publicly available information only. Hence, to the extent that bank 
share prices in emerging countries are found to respond to outlook, watch and rating signals, this implies either 
evidence against the semi-strong form EMH or the presence of private information available only to CRAs that 
is released into the public domain through credit signals (e.g. Brooks et al, 2004; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 
2012).  
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short-term funding. Relatively lower levels of government debt are beneficial to the banking 
sector, since these governments are viewed by market participants to be better able to support 
their banking sector. The overall government debt level and its rating level are not significant 
factors in cases of negative sovereign rating actions’ effects on bank valuations. In contrast to 
prior studies on developed countries, we find that larger banks in emerging countries are 
neither perceived as being safer nor more vulnerable in times of sovereign distress. This 
could be attributed to the relatively smaller banking sectors in the countries in our sample 
(e.g. compared to European studies). Cihak et al. (2012) identify significant variations in 
financial systems’ features across countries and regions and over time. They present a 
comprehensive analysis of financial system characteristics for 205 countries, and find that 
developing economy financial systems tend to be much less deep, less efficient and providing 
less access, yet their stability has been comparable to developed country financial systems.22  
 
5. Conclusions 
 The paper investigates the effects of sovereign rating actions by S&P, Moody’s and 
Fitch on the share prices of 277 banks in 19 emerging countries. We analyse three potential 
contagion channels between sovereign credit risk and bank valuations. There is strong 
evidence of the presence of a rating channel influencing the link between sovereign 
creditworthiness and bank valuations. The collateral channel and guarantee channel only 
play modest roles on the basis of our evidence, but are more relevant to emerging countries 
that experienced positive sovereign rating actions.  
                                                          
22 There is also a large literature on the relationships among financial sector development, bank competition and 
financial stability. For example, Beck et al. (2013) highlight cross-country heterogeneity in the relationship 
between bank competition and bank stability, and explore market, regulatory and institutional features that can 
explain the variations. Cubillas and Gonzalez (2014) show that financial liberalisation increases bank risk-taking 
but through different channels in developed and developing countries. In the latter, liberalisation increases bank 
risk by expanding their opportunities to take risk. 
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For the rating channel, we find that both positive and negative sovereign actions 
impact bank valuations, but the impact varies considerably across types of events and across 
CRAs. New rating information actions and outlook/watch actions have a strong impact on 
bank valuations, while S&P actions induce the strongest positive and significant impact on 
bank share prices. Negative bank cumulative abnormal returns in the pre-event window 
suggest that market sentiment is already negative prior to negative sovereign credit actions by 
Moody’s and S&P, implying a persisting effect of a downward trend. In addition, the impact 
of S&P credit actions on bank valuation is influenced by the level of government control over 
the banking system. Further, rating actions by Fitch have a stronger impact on bank 
valuations in countries with relatively higher levels of domestic credit. 
For the collateral channel, we find that positive sovereign credit actions (by 
Moody’s) in higher rated countries have a stronger impact on bank valuations, because these 
banks will potentially become less dependent on short-term funding. For the guarantee 
channel, we highlight that positive actions in emerging countries which are running relatively 
lower levels of overall government debt are more beneficial to their banking sector than for 
those which are more indebted. However, the size of banks in emerging countries appears to 
be an insignificant factor in the link between sovereign credit risk and bank share prices.  
An important implication for emerging market governments is how certain negative 
actions by S&P and Moody’s may exacerbate a downward trend, while negative outlook and 
watch signals by Fitch do not exacerbate any downward trend but impact on bank share 
prices. Another important finding is the information content of positive sovereign credit 
actions, and how these can invoke positive market sentiment for the banking system in 
emerging markets. Overall, we find evidence that shows a clear link between an emerging 
market government’s external credit standing and the market valuation of its banks. 
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Table 1- Credit rating scales 
Rating symbols Outlook/watch  
20-notch  
scale 
58-point  adjustments 
58-point CCR 
scale 
LCCR 
scale 
AAA/Aaa stable watch/outlook  20 
 
0 58 4.060 
AAA/Aaa negative outlook  20 58 -1 57 3.350 
AAA/Aaa negative watch  20  -2 56 2.927 
AA+/Aa1 positive watch  19  2 57 3.350 
AA+/Aa1 positive outlook  19  1 56 2.927 
AA+/Aa1 stable watch/outlook  19 55 0 55 2.621 
AA+/Aa1 negative outlook  19  -1 54 2.380 
AA+/Aa1 negative watch  19  -2 53 2.179 
AA/Aa2 positive watch  18  2 54 2.380 
AA/Aa2 positive outlook  18  1 53 2.179 
AA/Aa2 stable watch/outlook  18 52 0 52 2.005 
AA/Aa2 negative outlook  18  -1 51 1.852 
AA/Aa2 negative watch  18  -2 50 1.715 
AA-/Aa3 positive watch  17  2 51 1.852 
AA-/Aa3 positive outlook  17  1 50 1.715 
AA-/Aa3 stable watch/outlook  17 49 0 49 1.589 
AA-/Aa3 negative outlook  17  -1 48 1.473 
AA-/Aa3 negative watch  17  -2 47 1.365 
A+/A1 positive watch  16  2 48 1.473 
A+/A1 positive outlook  16  1 47 1.365 
A+/A1 stable watch/outlook  16 46 0 46 1.264 
A+/A1 negative outlook  16  -1 45 1.168 
A+/A1 negative watch  16  -2 44 1.076 
A/A2 positive watch  15  2 45 1.168 
A/A2 positive outlook  15  1 44 1.076 
A/A2 stable watch/outlook  15 43 0 43 0.989 
A/A2 negative outlook  15  -1 42 0.904 
A/A2 negative watch  15  -2 41 0.823 
A-/A3 positive watch  14  2 42 0.904 
A-/A3 positive outlook  14  1 41 0.823 
A-/A3 stable watch/outlook  14 40 0 40 0.744 
A-/A3 negative outlook  14  -1 39 0.668 
A-/A3 negative watch  14  -2 38 0.593 
BBB+/Baa1 positive watch  13  2 39 0.668 
BBB+/Baa1 positive outlook  13  1 38 0.593 
BBB+/Baa1 stable watch/outlook  13 37 0 37 0.520 
BBB+/Baa1 negative outlook  13  -1 36 0.448 
BBB+/Baa1 negative watch  13  -2 35 0.377 
BBB/Baa2 positive watch  12  2 36 0.448 
BBB/Baa2 positive outlook  12  1 35 0.377 
BBB/Baa2 stable watch/outlook  12 34 0 34 0.307 
BBB/Baa2 negative outlook  12  -1 33 0.238 
BBB/Baa2 negative watch  12  -2 32 0.170 
BBB-/Baa3 positive watch  11  2 33 0.238 
BBB-/Baa3 positive outlook  11  1 32 0.170 
BBB-/Baa3 stable watch/outlook  11 31 0 31 0.102 
BBB-/Baa3 negative outlook  11  -1 30 0.034 
BBB-/Baa3 negative watch  11  -2 29 -0.034 
BB+/Ba1 positive watch  10  2 30 0.034 
BB+/Ba1 positive outlook  10  1 29 -0.034 
BB+/Ba1 stable watch/outlook  10 28 0 28 -0.102 
BB+/Ba1 negative outlook  10  -1 27 -0.170 
BB+/Ba1 negative watch  10  -2 26 -0.238 
BB/Ba2 positive watch  9  2 27 -0.170 
BB/Ba2 positive outlook  9  1 26 -0.238 
BB/Ba2 stable watch/outlook  9 25 0 25 -0.307 
BB/Ba2 negative outlook  9  -1 24 -0.377 
BB/Ba2 negative watch  9  -2 23 -0.448 
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Table 1 continued.  
Rating symbols Outlook/watch  
20-notch  
scale 
58-point  adjustments 
58-point CCR 
scale 
LCCR 
scale 
BB-/Ba3 positive watch  8  2 24 -0.377 
BB-/Ba3 positive outlook  8  1 23 -0.448 
BB-/Ba3 stable watch/outlook  8 22 0 22 -0.520 
BB-/Ba3 negative outlook  8  -1 21 -0.593 
BB-/Ba3 negative watch  8  -2 20 -0.668 
B+/B1 positive watch  7  2 21 -0.593 
B+/B1 positive outlook  7  1 20 -0.668 
B+/B1 stable watch/outlook  7 19 0 19 -0.744 
B+/B1 negative outlook  7  -1 18 -0.823 
B+/B1 negative watch  7  -2 17 -0.904 
B/B2 positive watch  6  2 18 -0.823 
B/B2 positive outlook  6  1 17 -0.904 
B/B2 stable watch/outlook  6 16 0 16 -0.989 
B/B2 negative outlook  6  -1 15 -1.076 
B/B2 negative watch  6  -2 14 -1.168 
B-/B3 positive watch  5  2 15 -1.076 
B-/B3 positive outlook  5  1 14 -1.168 
B-/B3 stable watch/outlook  5 13 0 13 -1.264 
B-/B3 negative outlook  5  -1 12 -1.365 
B-/B3 negative watch  5  -2 11 -1.473 
CCC+/Caa1 positive watch  4  2 12 -1.365 
CCC+/Caa1 positive outlook  4  1 11 -1.473 
CCC+/Caa1 stable watch/outlook  4 10 0 10 -1.589 
CCC+/Caa1 negative outlook  4  -1 9 -1.715 
CCC+/Caa1 negative watch  4  -2 8 -1.852 
CCC/Caa2 positive watch  3  2 9 -1.715 
CCC/Caa2 positive outlook  3  1 8 -1.852 
CCC/Caa2 stable watch/outlook  3 7 0 7 -2.005 
CCC/Caa2 negative outlook  3  -1 6 -2.179 
CCC/Caa2 negative watch  3  -2 5 -2.380 
CCC-/Caa3 positive watch  2  2 6 -2.179 
CCC-/Caa3 positive outlook  2  1 5 -2.380 
CCC-/Caa3 stable watch/outlook  2 4 0 4 -2.621 
CCC-/Caa3 negative outlook  2  -1 3 -2.927 
CCC-/Caa3 negative watch  2  -2 2 -3.350 
CC, SD, D/ 
Ca, C/ RD, D 
  
 
1 
 
1 -4.060 
Table 1 presents the transformation of the alphabetical rating scale to 20-notch, 58-point CCR and 
LCCR numerical rating scales. The LCCR is based on a logit-type transformation (to address possible 
rating scale non-linearity) to the 58-point CCR, whereby LCCR = ln [CCR/ (59-CCR)] (See Sy, 
2004). While different categories can generate the same CCR score, there are no rating migrations 
between such categories. E.g. a BB/positive watch rated entity does not migrate to BB+/negative 
outlook.  
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics for credit data 
              S&P Moody's Fitch 
1 No. of countries         19 19 18 
        
2 Upgrades (solo) 
   
39 38 36 
3 Downgrades (solo) 
   
8 4 8 
4 Total rating changes (solo)       47 42 44 
        
5 Positive outlook actions (solo) 
   
49 32 40 
6 Negative outlook actions (solo) 
   
31 11 23 
7 Total outlook actions (solo)       80 43 63 
        
8 Positive watch actions (solo) 
   
2 25 4 
9 Negative watch actions (solo) 
   
4 2 4 
10 Total watch actions (solo)       6 27 8 
       
11 Upgrades and positive outlook action 
  
8 5 2 
12 Downgrades and negative outlook action 
  
9 1 8 
13 Downgrades and negative watch action 
  
4 4 3 
14 Total combined actions   21 10 13  
       
15 Total positive actions 
 
98 100 82  
16 Total negative actions   56 22 46 
                    
17 Total sovereign rating actions   154 122 128 
      
18 Clustered positive events 
   
21 24 22 
19 Clustered negative events       22 12 17 
20 Independent positive events 
   
77 76 60 
21 Independent negative events 
   
34 10 29 
        
22 Positive new information actions 
   
47 40 30 
23 Negative new information actions 
   
37 16 20 
24 New information as % of total actions ((Rows 22 + 23) / Row 17) 54% 46% 39% 
This table presents summary statistics for the dataset, which consists of daily information on long-term foreign-
currency ratings, outlooks and watch for emerging market sovereigns rated by Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch during the period 1st January 2001 to 30th September 2011. See footnote 4 for the list of countries. See 
Section 4.2 for the definitions of independent and clustered events and new information actions.  
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Table 3 – Preliminary analysis 
    CARs around S&P rating actions CARs around Moody’s rating actions CARs around Fitch rating actions 
    
N Pre-event Event Post-
event 
 
N Pre-event Event Post-
event 
 
N Pre-event Event Post-event 
P
a
n
el
 A
: 
P
o
si
ti
v
e 
ra
ti
n
g
 a
ct
io
n
s 
1 All actions 
 
1248 0.0178 0.0091 0.0043 
 
1186 -0.0048 -0.0028 -0.0002 
 
946 0.0009 -0.0077 -0.0021 
    
4.51** 6.67** 0.85 
  
-2.00* -2.58** -0.46 
  
0.06 -5.06** -1.20 
2 Actual upgrades only 
 
440 0.0226 0.0092 -0.0024 
 
457 -0.0091 -0.0043 -0.0101 
 
428 0.0015 -0.0035 0.0106 
    
4.22** 5.43** -1.66 
  
-1.99* -2.44* -2.53* 
  
1.02 -1.39 2.49* 
3 Combined actions only 
 
112 -0.0047 0.0177 -0.0082 
 
53 0.0028 -0.0108 -0.0206 
 
31 0.0411 0.0073 0.0519 
    
-0.25 3.59** -1.22 
  
0.22 -1.49 -2.73** 
  
2.65** 1.45 3.33** 
4 Outlook & watch action only 
 
696 0.0185 0.0077 0.0106 
 
676 -0.0025 -0.0011 0.0081 
 
487 -0.0022 -0.0124 -0.0166 
    
3.12** 3.23** 2.57* 
  
-0.84 -0.92 2.03* 
  
-1.87 -6.75** -4.45** 
5 New rating information 
 
579 0.0272 0.0172 0.0092 
 
460 -0.0140 0.0029 -0.0001 
 
400 -0.0136 0.0010 -0.0116 
    
3.87** 7.92** 1.78 
  
-4.72** 1.30 -0.10 
  
-2.00* 0.52 -2.82** 
6 Independent actions 
 
1006 0.0167 0.0093 0.0041 
 
888 -0.0043 -0.0011 -0.0028 
 
675 -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0029 
    
4.36** 5.99** 0.63 
  
-1.31 -1.10 -1.70 
  
-1.42 -2.69** -1.72 
7 Clustered actions 
 
242 0.0226 0.0081 0.0055 
 
298 -0.0063 -0.0077 0.0076 
 
271 0.0116 -0.0191 -0.0001 
    
1.44 2.93** 0.69 
  
-1.77 -3.28** 2.36* 
  
2.22* -4.76** -0.72 
P
a
n
el
 B
: 
N
eg
a
ti
v
e 
ra
ti
n
g
 a
ct
io
n
s 
8 All actions 
 
641 -0.0467 -0.0067 0.0168 
 
225 -0.0444 -0.0089 0.0015 
 
473 -0.0066 -0.0078 0.0088 
    
-7.66** -1.89 1.97* 
  
-4.44** -4.06** 0.26 
  
-1.20 -3.08** 0.84 
9 Actual downgrades only 
 
65 -0.0284 0.0090 0.0007 
 
49 -0.0046 -0.0147 0.0347 
 
81 0.0770 0.0064 0.0055 
    
-2.06* 1.11 1.29 
  
-0.48 -2.80** 1.48 
  
4.00** 1.88 0.09 
10 Combined actions only 
 
119 -0.0480 0.0014 0.0373 
 
37 -0.1136 -0.0111 -0.0197 
 
101 -0.0554 -0.0032 0.0626 
    
-10.12** 2.49* 0.48 
  
-4.47** -2.70** -1.69 
  
-2.40* -1.26 1.42 
11 Outlook & watch action only 
 
457 -0.0490 -0.0110 0.0137 
 
139 -0.0400 -0.0063 -0.0046 
 
291 -0.0129 -0.0133 -0.0090 
    
-6.22** -2.10* 2.40* 
  
-3.80** -2.29* -0.75 
  
-1.52 -3.73** -1.95 
12 New rating information 
 
495 -0.0405 -0.0060 0.0200 
 
155 -0.0417 -0.0089 -0.0110 
 
230 -0.0264 -0.0040 0.0192 
    
-5.35** -1.25 2.13* 
  
-2.84** -3.24** -0.94 
  
-2.31* -1.55 1.19 
13 Independent actions 
 
411 -0.0400 -0.0010 0.0130 
 
87 0.0104 -0.0019 -0.0230 
 
308 0.0195 -0.0047 0.0000 
    
-5.05** -0.06 2.38* 
  
1.91 -0.92 -1.28 
  
0.57 -2.07* 0.61 
14 Clustered actions 
 
230 -0.0586 -0.0169 0.0234 
 
138 -0.0789 -0.0134 0.0169 
 
165 -0.0552 -0.0135 0.0253 
    
-6.61** -3.32** 0.37 
  
-7.63** -4.58** 1.24 
  
-4.91** -2.30* 1.37 
This table presents the results of the average bank cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the time of sovereign rating actions by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch to 19 (18 for 
Fitch) emerging market countries in the period 1st January 2001 to 30th September 2011. See footnote 4 for the list of countries. We report the 10-day pre-event (-10, -1), the 
two-day event (0, +1) and the 10-day post-event (+2, +11) window CARs. Mean-adjusted returns calculations are specified in Section 4.3. t-statistics are the Boehmer at al. 
(1991) standardized cross-sectional t-statistics, and are reported beneath each coefficient. ** Significant at the 1% level; * significant at the 5% level.  
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Table 4 – The roles of sovereign rating and collateral channels – Eq. (2) 
  Panel A - Positive sovereign rating actions   Panel B - Negative sovereign rating actions 
 
Variables Aggregate S&P Moody's Fitch 
 
Variables Aggregate S&P Moody's Fitch 
 
New rating information 0.0133 0.0069 0.0084 0.0113 
 
New rating information -0.0069 -0.0014 -0.0517 -0.0804 
  
7.75** 2.09* 1.87 2.14* 
  
-1.27 -0.10 -2.70** -3.07** 
 
Speculative to investment 0.0205 0.0369 -0.0182 0.0712 
 
Investment to speculative 0.0022 -0.0398 n.a. 0.0743 
  
4.83** 4.68** -2.28* 6.88** 
  
0.16 -1.60 
 
1.49 
 
Outlook/watch actions -0.0003 0.0005 0.0041 -0.0136 
 
Outlook/watch actions -0.0229 -0.0375 -0.0238 0.0973 
  
-0.16 0.14 1.57 -4.01** 
  
-4.09** -2.17* -2.52* 2.58* 
 
Combined actions 0.0079 0.0197 -0.0148 -0.0242 
 
Combined actions 0.0002 -0.0031 -0.0172 0.0974 
  
1.87 2.63** -2.55* -2.30* 
  
0.03 -0.23 -1.29 2.41* 
 
CCR 0.0000 0.0001 0.0041 -0.0009 
 
CCR -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0028 -0.0015 
  
0.07 0.09 4.81** -1.05 
  
-1.94 -0.19 -1.88 -0.82 
 
Pspillover 0.0585 0.1587 0.0150 0.0580 
 
Pspillover 0.0235 0.1476 n.a. -0.3282 
  
6.95** 6.43** 1.62 3.37** 
  
1.24 1.65 
 
-1.39 
 
Nspillover -0.0449 -0.1371 -0.0869 0.2829 
 
Nspillover 0.0167 0.0617 n.a. 0.0918 
  
-1.48 -2.11* -2.14* 2.88** 
  
1.38 2.83** 
 
1.32 
 
Plagged -0.0112 -0.0537 -0.0765 -0.0452 
 
Nlagged 0.0076 0.0729 n.a. 0.0413 
  
-0.74 -1.75 -2.54* -1.09 
  
0.81 0.85 
 
1.27 
 
Constant 0.0037 0.0383 -0.0876 -0.0383 
 
Constant 0.0314 -0.0038 0.2029 -0.0856 
  
0.28 1.72 -3.56** -1.77 
  
1.98* -0.13 2.51* -1.49 
 
Country and Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Country and Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N 3348 1237 1168 943 
 
N 1205 617 225 431 
  R2 0.070 0.162 0.130 0.271   R2 0.076 0.127 0.320 0.304 
This table presents the coefficient estimates of Eq. (2) using data samples of emerging market countries rated by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch during January 2001 to September 
2011. CARijt: the dependent variable, is the mean-adjusted cumulative abnormal return of bank i in sovereign j in the two-day event window (0, +1) around sovereign rating 
actions at time t. New rating information is a dummy variable that indicates whether a rating action provides new information. Speculative to investment (Investment to 
speculative) is a dummy variable that indicates whether a rating action takes sovereign j from speculative (investment) grade to investment (speculative) grade. Out/watch is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the rating action is a change to the outlook or watch status of sovereign j, with no rating change. Combined is a dummy variable that 
indicates whether sovereign j is upgraded (downgraded) and simultaneously placed on positive (negative) outlook or watch status. Combined can also take a value of 1, if 
sovereign j is subject to more than one rating action by more than one CRA on the same day. CCR is sovereign j’s rating level according to the 58-point numerical scale 
immediately prior to the rating action. Pspillover (Nspillover) is a positive (negative) net total change in LCCR (see footnote 15 and Table 1) in the past 10 trading days from 
all three CRAs of the countries in the same world region as the event sovereign (s). The absolute value of Nspillover is employed for ease of interpretation. Plagged 
(Nlagged) is a positive (negative) net total change in LCCR of sovereign j in the last 10 trading days from all three CRAs. Full sets of event Country and Year dummies are 
included. ‘n.a.’ is not applicable due to lack of observations. We apply Huber-White robust standard errors, and t-statistics are reported beneath each coefficient.  
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.  
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Table 5 - The roles of financial freedom and domestic credit - Eq. (3) 
 Panel A - Positive sovereign rating actions  Panel B – Negative sovereign rating actions 
 
Variables Aggregate S&P Moody's Fitch   Variables Aggregate S&P Moody's Fitch 
 
New rating information 0.0130 0.0087 0.0096 0.0090 
 
New rating information -0.0066 0.0123 0.0112 -0.0518 
  
7.56** 2.62** 2.11* 1.61 
  
-1.23 0.81 0.59 -1.76 
 
Speculative to investment 0.0200 0.0331 -0.0160 0.0640 
 
Investment to speculative 0.0247 -0.0096 n.a. 0.0525 
  
4.69** 4.07** -1.95 5.80** 
  
1.80 -0.39 
 
1.26 
 
Outlook/watch actions 0.0003 0.0034 0.0039 -0.0138 
 
Outlook/watch actions -0.0178 -0.0275 -0.0238 0.0836 
  
0.15 0.94 1.42 -4.21** 
  
-3.11** -1.67 -2.52* 2.03* 
 
Combined actions 0.0086 0.0191 -0.0127 -0.0290 
 
Combined actions 0.0012 0.0070 -0.0172 0.0767 
  
2.00* 2.53* -2.13* -2.67** 
  
0.17 0.50 -1.29 1.62 
 
CCR 0.0001 0.0005 0.0040 -0.0013 
 
CCR -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0010 
  
0.16 0.40 4.82** -1.55 
  
-1.60 0.09 -1.88 -0.56 
 
Pspillover 0.0596 0.1713 0.0152 0.0469 
 
Pspillover 0.0322 0.1758 n.a. -0.3430 
  
7.08** 6.98** 1.65 2.70** 
  
1.70 2.16* 
 
-1.33 
 
Nspillover -0.0574 -0.1916 -0.0825 0.2926 
 
Nspillover 0.0267 0.0725 n.a. 0.0926 
  
-1.81 -2.76** -1.65 2.93** 
  
2.20* 3.77** 
 
1.25 
 
Plagged -0.0085 -0.0286 -0.0766 -0.0419 
 
Nlagged 0.0097 0.0797 n.a. 0.0403 
  
-0.56 -0.93 -2.54* -1.00 
  
0.96 0.95 
 
1.13 
 
Financial freedom -0.0130 -0.0550 -0.0035 -0.0001 
 
Financial freedom 0.0285 -0.1595 0.0463 0.0065 
  
-1.95 -4.78** -0.23 -0.01 
  
1.32 -2.97** 1.35 0.04 
 
Domestic credit/GDP -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0009 
 
Domestic credit/GDP -0.0022 0.0026 0.0014 -0.0039 
  
-0.55 1.64 -1.36 2.73** 
  
-5.96** 1.40 2.04* -2.74** 
 
Constant 0.0553 0.2356 -0.0626 -0.0498 
 
Constant -0.0461 0.5374 -0.1953 -0.0296 
  
1.81 5.15** -0.94 -0.85 
  
-0.55 3.02** -1.19 -0.04 
 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N 3348 1237 1168 943 
 
N 1205 617 225 431 
  R2 0.071 0.177 0.131 0.278   R2 0.097 0.137 0.320 0.358 
This table presents the results of Eq. (3) using data samples of emerging market countries rated by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch during January 2001 to September 2011. CARijt: 
the dependent variable, is the mean-adjusted cumulative abnormal return of bank i in sovereign j in the two-day event window (0, +1) around sovereign rating actions at time 
t. Financial freedom is the financial freedom of sovereign j according The Heritage Foundation’s Financial Freedom index as defined in Section 4.4. Domestic credit/GDP is 
the domestic credit provided by the financial sector as a share of GDP. All other variables are the same as specified in Table 4. We apply Huber-White robust standard errors, 
and t-statistics are reported beneath each coefficient. ** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level. 
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Table 6- The role of a guarantee channel – Eq. (4) 
 Panel A - Positive sovereign rating actions  Panel B - Negative sovereign rating actions 
 
Variables Aggregate S&P Moody's Fitch 
 
Variables Aggregate S&P Moody's Fitch 
 
New rating information 0.0135 0.0093 0.008 0.0119 
 
New rating information -0.008 -0.0001 0.0743 -0.0645 
  
7.70** 2.69** 1.69 2.02* 
  
-1.39 -0.01 4.36** -2.06* 
 
Speculative to investment 0.0225 0.0384 -0.0127 0.0698 
 
Investment to speculative 0.0051 0.0352 n.a. 0.0813 
  
4.98** 4.58** -1.58 5.97** 
  
0.28 1.38 
 
1.73 
 
Outlook/watch actions -0.0016 -0.0006 0.0023 -0.0149 
 
Outlook/watch actions -0.0227 -0.0526 -0.0243 0.0616 
  
-0.81 -0.15 0.79 -4.16** 
  
-3.58** -2.74** -2.52* 1.30 
 
Combined actions 0.0074 0.0174 -0.0171 -0.0264 
 
Combined actions -0.001 -0.0063 -0.0181 0.0391 
  
1.70 2.30* -2.88** -2.34* 
  
-0.13 -0.44 -1.37 0.73 
 
CCR -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0037 -0.0004 
 
CCR -0.0018 0.0023 -0.0028 -0.0025 
  
-0.12 -0.19 3.97** -0.53 
  
-1.79 0.99 -1.87 -1.29 
 
Pspillover 0.0624 0.175 0.0182 0.0582 
 
Pspillover 0.0183 0.208 n.a. 0.5558 
  
6.59** 6.27** 1.84 3.33** 
  
0.96 2.46* 
 
1.30 
 
Nspillover -0.0157 -0.0778 -0.051 0.2938 
 
Nspillover 0.0227 0.0707 n.a. -0.1751 
  
-0.49 -1.24 -1.08 2.90** 
  
1.83 3.28** 
 
-1.34 
 
Plagged -0.006 -0.0525 -0.0543 -0.0481 
 
Nlagged 0.0069 0.031 n.a. 0.0113 
  
-0.38 -1.56 -1.68 -1.08 
  
0.71 0.35 
 
0.31 
 
Debt/GDP -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0001 
 
Debt/GDP 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0008 0.0019 
  
-3.97** -2.32* -1.99* 0.40 
  
0.62 1.28 -2.25* 2.97** 
 
TA/GDP 0.1892 0.3674 0.2479 -0.0679 
 
TA/GDP -0.1639 -0.1788 -1.0366 -0.2862 
  
1.44 1.40 1.36 -0.30 
  
-0.49 -0.27 -1.79 -0.76 
 
Constant 0.0236 0.0659 -0.0708 -0.0511 
 
Constant 0.0344 -0.0672 0.1485 -0.1209 
  
1.59 2.05* -2.71** -1.93 
  
1.24 -1.37 2.74** -2.29* 
 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N 3077 1124 1069 884 
 
N 1077 551 211 382 
 
R2 0.074 0.171 0.134 0.259 
 
R2 0.082 0.135 0.335 0.355 
This table presents the coefficient estimates of Eq. (4) using data samples of emerging market countries rated by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch during January 2001 to September 
2011. CARijt: the dependent variable, is the mean-adjusted cumulative abnormal return of bank i in sovereign j in the two-day event window (0, +1) around sovereign rating 
actions at time t. Debt/GDP is the total government debt as a percentage of GDP of sovereign j at the year-end prior to the sovereign rating action. TA/GDP is the total assets 
of bank i over the GDP of its home sovereign j. All other variables are the same as specified in Table 4. We apply Huber-White robust standard errors, and t-statistics are 
reported beneath each coefficient. ** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level. 
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Fig. 1. Distribution of daily 58-point numerical ratings of 19 sovereign issuers in emerging markets during the period 1st January 2001 to 30th September 
2011. See footnote 4 for the list of countries. The credit ratings scale is transformed into a 58-point numerical scale (See Table 1).   
 
